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ABSTRACT: In the first part of my paper I will analyze the important role of 
SMEs as the most crucial factor for the development of the local entrepreneurship. In 
addition I will quote the arising difficulties in SMEs’ access to loans. This part will be 
concluded  by the presentation of the Third Consultative Paper of The Basel II Capital 
Accord, in relation to its impact on SMEs, focussing on the comments of the 
European Central Bank, World Bank Eurochabres, and of the European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association and more specifically, on those referring to 
SMEs.. The second part will refer to the Structure of the New Accord Three Pillars, 
focussing on the Basel II Capital Adequacy framework and specifically on the first 
pillar (Minimum Capital Requirement). Obviously, the said part will be completed by 
the consequences of the aforementioned topic for the SMEs. In the third and last 
part of my paper I will work out a critical analysis of the New Basel Capital Accord, 
concentrating on its pros and corns for SMEs’ banking finance. Finally, my paper will 
contain an appendix of tables and graphs and of course the relevant references.    2
PART I 
SMEs’, THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT THEY FACE AND THE 
THIRD CONSULTATIVE PAPER (CP3) OF THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL 
ACCORD  
 
1.  SMEs and the financial difficulties that they face – Ways of solving it 
The SME enterprises have played a very important role in the economic and 
regional development of the E.U’s Countries and especially of Greece. In fact, 
about 800.000 enterprises in my Country fell into the <<small business>> 
category. These firms accounted for 80% of total employment in Greece. 
Generally, we can say that important as they are, small business are behind large 
companies in terms of productivity, technological experience, financial and other 
areas. Particularly, they often lack creditworthiness. They have trouble securing 
funds needed for their business activities, such as purchasing materials and 
products and investing in plant and equipment. Since most small companies have 
only limited capital resources, they have to rely on banks and other financial 
institutions for their funds. Banks require sufficient collateral or a well-
established surety for their debtors to secure a loan. The lack of such assets or 
appropriate surety makes it difficult for many small business to obtain loans from 
financial houses.  
European Union’s aid for the reinforcement of the competitiveness of small 
medium enterprises is always of crucial importance for the development of 
Member-States productive environment. The European Investment Fund, (E.I.F.), 
by its SMEs Guarantee Facility (4 special windows), generally, provides support 
to Guarantee Societies, and of course, it  provides also support and to the New 
Greek Institution. of  Small and very Small Guarantee Fund S.A, in the form of 
counter-guarantee of commitments undertaking by it. More specifically, in the 
case of Greek SMEs Guarantee Fund  backed by  a E.I.F. SMEs Guarantee 
Facility, counter-guarantee, the risk is shared between the Guarantee Society and 
the Counter-Guarantor, without any further risk analysis. In the majority of cases, 
no fee is levied by the counter-guarantor, (E.I.F. SMEs Guarantee Facility), to the 
guarantee society, (Greek SMEs Guarantee Fund S.A.).During the period 1998-  3
2001, the E.I.F. SMEs Guarantee Facility. offered to cover 50% of the loses 
incurred by guarantee funds. In return, guarantee societies are expected to 
increase their risk profile by supporting higher risk SMEs investments with the 
objective of fostering <<growth and employment>>. Assistance, was provided 
either directly to guarantee societies or via publicly funded intermediaries, such us 
the aforementioned  guarantee schemes. In fact, we can say that there will be a 
strong relationship between the two Guarantee Schemes. Focussing on their 
cooperation in the E.U’s –National and Regional/Local level. Actually, we can 
consider the E.I.F. SME Guarantee Facility as a Counter Guarantee Fund, or  as a 
Credit Insurance Corporation and the Greek SME;s Guarantee Fund S.A., as a 
Credit Guarantee Corporation. The role of the above mentioned Institution, which 
was planed in the framework of the third CSF (2000-2006), in the context of 
Business Plan << Competitiveness >>, axis 2, measure 2.6. for <<the financial 
support and encouraging of the SME>>, is to allocate the business risk and to 
guarantee part of the bank loans to the SME. 
Some characteristic Examples of Guarantee Schemes set up with assistancee from 
the Structural Funds of  E.U, include: 
© In Italy, the Eurofidi, which is a mutual guarantee fund providing loan 
guarantees to SMEs. Thus, its promary objective is to facilitate access to finance 
for SMEs in the Piedmont Region. Moreover, it assists financial institutions in 
screening loan applications and in risk management. 




-export credit guarantees. 
The above case study focuses on Finnvera’s  portfolio of  guarantee products, 
which are tailored according to the needs of SMEs depending on the business 
sector in which they operate and on their developmental needs and objectives.   
  
The previous to the examined Institution scheme is the System of Mutual 
Guarantee Companies, that was founded in 1917 in France (nowadays, the   4
relevant Institution in France is called SOFARIS e.g Societe Franca;ise de 
Guarantee des Financements des PME. It is supported by the Banque du 
Development des P.M.E.) and simultaneously, it was developed  in the majority 
of  central Europe countries (such as Germany, where there are 2 relevant 
Organizations a) The Kreditanstait fur Wiederautbau “KFW” and b) The 
Deutsche  Ausgleichbank “DtA”, Italy, relevant Organization “Mediocredito 
Centrale”, which cooperates with “Confindi” e.g Cooperatives of  Mutual 
Guarantee, such us Mutual Guarantee Companies, Belgium etc), during the 
1980s’ decade. In the early of 1990 decade, the European Community (E.U), 
started to support the aforementioned Institution, in order to facilitate the Small 
and Medium Enterprises to obtain loans from the Banking System. In Greece, the 
Institution of M.G.C, was adopted in 1995, by the law 2367/1995. This System 
made up, in my Country, for facing the financial disadvantages of  Greek Small 
Enterprises and reinforcing their important role, that is the creation of new jobs, 
by guaranteeing the repayment of their loans, which makes it easier for small 
businesses to borrow from the banks. 
The Institution of Mutual Guarantee Companies hasn’t activate in Greece, 
because, no company has been established under this umbrella, due to: 
-  unwillingness and difficulty that face the chambers of commerce to participate 
in 65% of the shared fund and 
-  the fact that the Counter – Guarantee Institution is still pending, as the 
legislative framework which would govern the Mutual Guarantee Companies, 
has never been compleded. Actually, Once the Fund was established, 
Companies would have to sign an agreement with it defining their rights and 
obligations. Moreover, an issue which might would be complicated the 
relationship between the Counter-Guarantee Fund and the Companies, 
concerned the point of activation of the Counter-Guarantee Fund. There were 
two possibilities, either the Fund insured each loan individually or it insured 
the Company as a whole. In the former case, the Fund would intervene (i.e. 
compensate the Company) each time a loan was not repaid. In the latter case,         5
the Fund would intervened only once a Company had exhausted its provisions 
and was unable to fulfill its guarantee obligations. 
   
The establishment of Small and very Small Mutual Guarantee Fund in Greece is 
governing by the Law 3066 / 18.10.2002, chapter A’  and especially by its articles  
1- 10. 
2.  The 3
rd Consultative paper (CP3) of the New Basel Capital Accord and its 
impact to SMEs 
On 10
th July 2002 occurred a very crucial meeting of members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. These members reached agreement on a 
number of  important issues related to the New Basel Capital Accord that the 
Committee has been exploring since releasing its January 2001 consultative 
paper. In its discussions, the Committee has considered a range of issues related 
to both the standardised and internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches to credit risk. 
In this context, it is reaffirmed the importance of the revised standardised 
approach to be used by the majority of banks world wide. More specifically, as far 
as the SMEs concerns, the Committee approved new elements of the corporate 
and retail IRB frameworks and the standardised approach designed to ensure a 
more appropriate treatment of small and medium-sized firms under the New 
Accord. Thus, in recognition of the different risks associated with SMEs 
borrowers, under the IRB approach for corporate credits, banks will be permitted 
to separately distinguish loans to SME borrowers (defined  as those with less than 
Euro 50 mn in annual sales) from those to larger firms. The deduction in the 
required amount of capital will be as high as 20%, depending on the size of the 
borrower and should result in an average reduction of approximately 10% across 
the entire set of SMEs borrowers in the IRB framework for corporate loans. In 
addition, banks that manage SMEs related exposures in a similar manner to retail 
exposure will be permitted to apply the retail IRB treatment to such exposures, 
provided that the total exposure of a bank to an individual Small Business is less 
than 1 Euro mn and a similar threshold will be established in the standardised 
approach.      6
On 29
th April 2003 the Basel Committee, issued its 3
rd consultative proposals on 
the New Basel Capital Accord. In August 2003, the Basel Committee published 
the comments received on this consultative paper and also issued a report on the 
high-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord. In 
this part, my analysis is focussed on the comments of the European Central Bank, 
World Bank Eurochabres, and of the European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association and more specifically, on those referring to SMEs.                         
•  European Central Bank : The E.C.B. notes that the 3
rd Consultative 
Proposals mark significant progress relative to the previous  proposals of the 
ECBS. The improvement include, inter alia, the flattering of the risk weight 
curves for internal ratings based (IRB) approaches, the retail exposures, and 
the revised proposals for operational risk for banks or banking systems 
experiencing high credit margins and finally the treatment of banks exposures 
to SMEs, which is the main subject of my paper. But the right implementation 
of all the above mentioned elements, suggests a need for enhanced vigilance 
and close cooperation between central banks and supervisory authorities. 
Finishing this topic, I also would like to mention that the ECB continues to 
support the building up of additional financial buffers’ in favorable economic 
times which can be used in less favorable  economic conditions when, inter 
alia,equity financing may be more difficult to obtain on the markets. The 
counter – cyclical effect of such methods could be acknowledged by making 
an explicit reference to them in the text of Pillar II.  
•  World Bank : The World Bank supports the efforts of the Basel Committee 
to establish a string relationship between the empirical assessment of credit 
risk embedded in banks balance sheet and capital requirements. In addition, it 
feels that the calibration of current capital requirements has improved as a 
result of the quantitative exercises conducted by banks from both G10 and  
non-G10 countries. Furthermore, the World Bank still views the current risk 
weights as largely defined on the basis of evidence from G10 countries which 
may offer very different levels of protection in emerging economies. Going 
forward, the more important issues related to Pillar I, (the Pillar that I am   7
going to exam thoroughly in the 2
nd part of my paper), on which the World 
Bank would like to work together with Basel Capital Accord, especially with 
regard to sharing cross country experiences, to provide more guidance to 
developing countries  are the following:    
-Risk weight of individual claims 
-Concentration risk and 
- Operational risk 
In this topic, my analysis, is focusing on Risk weight of individual claims  and  
especially on SME lending, because the definition of SMEs lending reflects 
standards prevailing in large industrial countries and doesn’t appropriately 
capture the risk features of similar size firms in smaller economies. So, the 
discretion left to national authorities to set higher capital requirements for 
SMEs lending could as in the case of sovereign borrowers, be complimented 
by a list of criteria that could ensure some coordination among bank 
supervision in different countries.    
•  Eurochambres:  The Chambers appreciate the results achieved since now, 
related to:  
-Preferwential treatment of Small-Medium Firms (retail loans) 
-Lower risk weights for credit exposures (retail and corporate loans) of 
business 
-Expansion of the range of eligible collateral for business 
-Recognition for both external and internal credit ratings. 
In particular, as far as the SMEs concerns, according to Eurochambres’ 
estimations, the New Basel Capital Accord will still have major consequences 
for SMEs finances in the E.U. The most important think here is the significant 
progress that has been achieved in the negotiations in the Basel Committee, 
during the last 2 years. The proposed treatment of loan exposures to SMEs of 
up 1Euro million, as retail exposure, is an improvement for many loans to this 
category of firms, even compared to the existing capital regulations. In 
addition, they acknowledge that it is shown a significant reduction in the 
banks’ capital requirements for retail loans to SMEs and in general a slight   8
reduction of the capital requirements for loans to SMEs. However, 
implementation costs in the banking sector must be kept within limits in order 
not to annul the advantages for SMEs. Thus, with a view to the high 
complexity of the 3
rd consultative document, they ask the Basel Committee to 
reduce the volume and complexity of regulations significantly, so that the 
Accord can be implemented without large costs. In general, it is important that 
banks, (including the smaller ones), can implement an Internal  Rating Based  
System, without disproportionate costs. Because, otherwise bank lending 
could become more expensive for Small – Medium Sized Firms. Moreover, 
there has to be a reasonable approach concerning operational risk, since that 
aspect reduces the room for banks to give loans to small companies. 
Nevertheless, the Chambers welcome the commitment of the Basel 
Committee that the aggregate level of regulatory capital in the banking system 
should not increase due to the new regulations. They also note that the 
Implication of the new framework for SMEs will depend very much on the 
discretion of the supervisory authorities. In fact, they think that some more 
guidance for the use of these discretionary powers of the authorities is 
necessary in the New Basel Accord itself. Otherwise there could be different 
supervisory interpretations having an indirect impact on SMEs  and corporate  
finance and consequently a distorting effect on competition. Finally, the 
Eurochambres, welcome the proposals in pillar 3 (Market discipline) 
concerning the transparency of rating systems. For SMEs customers of banks, 
it is important that the criteria, under which a SME is rated, are transparent vis 
a vis the SME. The rating system of  a bank should not be a dark horse for the 
SMEs ‘ customer. So, the relevant criteria affecting the rating of the SMEs 
should be transparent at least to the Small Firms itself when it is seeking and 
negotiating a loan. 
•  European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA): 
EVCA welcomes the further opportunity offered by the Basel Committee to 
comment on the 3
rd Consultative Paper in respect of the proposals for a New   9
Basel Accord. More specifically its more crucial comments on the New 
Accord are: 
-Banks play a crucial role in financing European Small – Medium Sized 
Companies by providing them with equity through private equity and venture 
capital houses. 
-The current Basel II draft could lead to a significant retreat by banks from 
private and venture capital funds due to the proposed changes in risk 
weightings for assessing business risk. 
-No quantitative assessment is publicly available regarding the exact impact of 
the proposed regulatory capital increases on private equity and venture capital. 
In short, there is a real risk that the current Basel II Paper , would not only 
harm the private equity and venture capital industry, but also significantly 
reduce annual flows of equity finance available to E.U companies (especially 
the Smaller ones) leaving them at a global competitive disadvantage.  
-The risk weightings currently proposed for the industry do not correspond to 
business realities. EVCA urges the Bsel Committee to ensure sufficient 
flexibility in the Accord, so that by the implementation of it in 2007, the most 
recent risk available are used.  
-EVCA urges National Supervisors to avoid the increase of risk weight for 
private equity and venture capital, as stated in the Standardised Approach. 
-EVCA urges the Basel Committee to amend the paragraphs  related  to 
Grandfathering, in order to include positions taken until the data of 
implementation (end of 2006) and not till the date of publication of the final 
Accord.  
Apart from the above mentioned, EVCA considers that more time is needed to 
ensure that standards not only meet the Basel Committee’s aims of fostering  
improvements in Banks  risk management and risk assessment capabilities, 
but also fully correspond to the changing  small business realities  of company 




THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD - 
APPLICABILITY, ITS OBJECTIVES / DIFFICULTIES OF 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCIES FOR THE SMEs’ 
 
1.  The structure of the New Basel Capital Accord and its applicability 
The New Framework is based on the following 3 pillars (see relative graphs  of the 
Appendix): 
•  First pillar: Minimum capital requirement-Capital Adequacy 
•  Second pillar: Supervisory review process 
•  Third pillar: Market discipline 
More specifically, by pillar
1: 
                                                           
1 Phaidon Kalphaoglou , parts of his relative presentation in the post graduate program in <<Banking 
Studies>> (March, 2004)   11  12
   13  14
The applicability of the aforementioned structure relies on the <<internationally 
active banks>> and on a consolidated basis on holding companies that are parents of 
banking groups.   15  16
2.  The objectives of the New Basel Capital Accord and the arisen difficulties 
The more characteristic objectives of the revision are the following: 
•  Better assessment of capital adequacy in relation to a bank’s true risk profile. 
•  Taking into account hedging strategies . 
•  Coverage of credit, market and operational risk. 
•  Portfolio diversification is taken into account. and 
•  Possible arbitrage of regulatory capital requirements are tackled.  
But unfortunately,  the above mentioned, very important, objectives expected to find 
some difficulties concerning the involved countries and more specifically: 
•  Their  national characteristics 
•  Their national accounting requirements  
•  Their national market conditions and 
•  Their national loan loss provisions.  
  In view of the above and for ensuring the effective implementation of the New 
Accord, the Committee has taken strides to clarify and simplify the structure of the 
revised Accord. Particular attention has been given to the market discipline 
component (Pillar 3), of the new framework. Thus, the Committee aims to provide 
investors with enough information to understand a bank’s risk profile without 
imposing an undue burden on any institution. Accordingly, the disclosure 
requirements have been streamlined to focus on elements needed to accomplish this 
objective. Another area of emphasis has been given in streamlining the minimum 
standards for the Internal Ratings Based approach. These requirements were 
developed to ensure an appropriate degree of credibility and consistency in banks’ use 
of internal ratings for capital purposes. The Committee has recently revisited the 
minimum standards. Furthermore, modifications have been made to allow for 
consistent application of the requirements, as well as to allow for innovation and 
appropriate differences in the way in which banking organizations operate. Changes 
have also been made to permit greater flexibility to banks in implementing the IRB 
approach across  their various portfolios, in terms of both timing and scope. Apart of 
the above, the Committee will continue to look for ways to further streamline the 
New Capital framework, where appropriate. Generally, we can say that the   17
Committee is pleased with the progress made and looks forward to the successful 
finalization of the examined New Accord by the end of the year 2005.      18
      19  20
3.  The importance of The Basel’s II New Capital Accord implementation phase 
and its consequences for the SMEs 
 
A) The importance of The Basel’s II New Capital Accord implementation phase 
The New Accord is a complex framework in comparison with the current one. A full 
understanding of all its possible implications will be possible only some time after 
implementation, on an ex post evaluation phase. For this reason, close monitoring of 
the application of the New Regime will be important. In this regard, 4 issues can be 
highlighted
2: 
•  First, in drawing up the agreement, the emphasis has been rightly placed on the 
implications of the New Accord for risk management and financial stability. The 
New Accord, however, is also set to have important structural implications for 
banks and banking systems through changing bank behavior. The very diverse   
effects on capital requirements for individual banks triggered by the New Accord  
are likely to influence their business strategies through, for example, mergers and 
acquisitions, a reallocation of their loan books (e.g. through credit risk transfers 
or a restructuring of existing transactions), an increased specialization  on 
products and/or counterparts with a particular risk profit and a restructuring of 
retail banking activities in the form of revolving exposures. These structural   
changes will also have to be monitored  closely from a central perspective.   
•  Second, pro-cyclicality concerns could be particularly relevant in the first phase 
of the implementation of the new framework when banks are adjusting to the new 
settings. This may require closer monitoring by central banks and supervisory 
authorities, so that potential problems can be detected and addressed in a timely 
fashion. Enhanced corporate governance by banks will also be an important 
complement to the activities of public authorities in ensuring a smooth transition 
of the new regime. 
•  Third, in the area of real estate lending the ECB has no objection to the new and 
more flexible treatment proposed under both the standardized and IRB (Internal 
Rating Based) approaches. However, it cautions that the extended recognition of 
real estate collateral should not lead to excessive real estate lending and an   21
overheating of property markets. This entails a need for prudent valuations by 
banks to prevent increases in credit availiability from fuelling asset price bubbles 
for residential and commercial properties. 
•  Fourth, in the area of credit cards, the proposed reduction in regulatory capital is 
significant and, for some banks at least, will determine a level of regulatory 
capital well below the economic one. Under these circumstances, it is 
emphasized that excessive lending to retail customers via credit cards, especially 
in periods of booming economic activity, may lead to undesirable 
macroeconomic effects, such as increased  consumer spending and increased 
household debt. In addition, the particularly low capital requirements for 
revolving retail exposures relative to similar types of unsecured personal cosumer 
loans may have structural implications as banks could be induced to structure 
retail banking in the form of revolving exposures. This may hold true in 
particular, in E.U. countries, where unsecured consumer loans and other similar 
types of exposures are widely used in addition to credit cards. An expansion of 
the latter type of credit could have implications for banks’ risk management as 
the mix of the their risks could change (note the relative importance of 
operational risk for credit card based exposures). Also, the low loss rates and 
subdued volatility for credit cards seem to be a characteristic of the more nature 
US market. All the above elements suggest, as I have already mentioned, a need 
for enhanced vigilance and close co-operation between central banks and 
supervisory authorities in the implementation phase.        
 
B) The New Basel’s Capital Accord consequences for the SMEs 
The debate about the effects of Basel II on SMEs is based on 2 main arguments
3: 
a)  The Basel II will lead to an overall increase in the cost of borrowing for SMEs. 
b)  The Basel II will probably arise obstacles and consequently will reduce the supply 
of credit to SMEs in general. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 ECB<<The New Basel  Capital Accord>> (August 2003) 
3 Dorothea  Schafer <<The New Basel Capital Accord and its Impact on Small and Medium Sized 
Companies>>, article in the Economic Bulletin, (Springer Editions, 2003)    22
As far as somebody understands, the aforementioned arguments, would have a 
negative effect on growth and employment, given that the SMEs are the main bon of 
the economies of E.U’s countries, especially on those of Objective 1, like my Country 
Greece.  Thus, we can say that Basel II may create many difficulties to the economies 
of  E.U’ s Member States. But before assessing the validity of these theories, it will 
be useful to be informed about the main characteristics of the SMEs in the majority of 
E.U’s countries. More specifically: 
-  90% of SMEs are family oriented, given that they have a maximum of 10 
employees (e.g,. 90% approximately, are owner managed) and an annual 
turnover of less than 1 EURO million. 
-  The average capital ratio is less than 25-30% 
-  The typical collateral for SMEs is either internal assets or chattel mortgages 
on life assurance policies and home savings agreements. 
-  The most of the SMEs take on long term loans. 
-  Very few SMEs have an external rating. 
-  The insolvency rate for SMEs was 1% maximum in 2001. 
In view of the above, as it is obvious, the Small owned managed  Business, with little 
liable equity capital, represent a higher statistical  risk and, thus, tend to receive a 
lower rating than large firms, with high equity capital. For a long time, the Basel 
Committee didn’t consider that Small-Medium Firms’ typical collateral can reduce 
their lending risk. In addition, long-term loans are considered riskier than short-term 
loans. Consequently, in the light of the first 2 Consultative Papers (1999, 2001), these 
factors did indeed constitute a serious problem for the SMEs of the most of E.U. 
Countries, especially of those of the Objective 1 regions. However, their impact has 
been considerably weakened by the Committee’s resolutions of July 2002.
4 The 
above mentioned resolutions are also part of the new consultative paper that has 
presented in May 2003.
5    
 
                                                           
4 The Basel Committee reaches agreement on New Capital  Accord issues (Basel Committee press 
release of 10.7.2002.  
5 The New Basel Committee Capital Accord <<Third Consultative Paper>>, (Basel 2003).    23
PART III 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS IN A FORM OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND ITS PROS AND CORNS 
FOR  SMEs 
1.  Critical Analysis of the New Basel Capital Accord 
From all the aforementioned, it is clear that   The New Basel Capital Accord could 
lead to a significant retreat by banks, especially from private equity and venture 
capital funds, due to the proposed changes in risk weightings for assessing business 
risk. This could deprive European companies (mainly SMEs). In that framework, 
initially, everybody welcomes the approach  of the 3
rd Consultative Document to 
prevent negative effects arising from the implementation of the New Basel Accord, 
for  SMEs  and particularly for those whose loan volumes exceed the retail threshold 
by taking into account their revenues (firm size adjustment in the corporate portfolio-
SME s Portfolio). But according to Eurochambres comments on the 3
rd Consultative 
Document, this firm size adjustment should not be restricted  to the Internal Rating 
Based Approach. So, they propose a special risk weight in the standardized approach 
for non-retail loans to SMEs with sales of up to Euro 50 m, which should be between 
75% for retail loans  and 100% for unrated  corporates  (in this case, the risk  weight 
should be near the risk weight for retail loans, e.g.80%). In the IRB approach, risk 
weights for SMEs above the retail threshold should be lower and nearer the retail risk 
weights. This would also prevent a << cliff effect>> (e.g.large difference in risk 
weights for loans of up to E1 m and slightly above E1m). Therefore, risk weight 
curves for SMEs should be flattened further and the Chambres urge that this firm size 
adjustment should not be restricted  to IRB-approach. Thus, they believe that in that 
way, risk weight calculations in the SME-portfolio/IRB-approach, should come to 
similar results to the risk weights in the proposed to the 3
rd Consultative Paper 
approach. Furthermore, the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA), urges the Basel Committee to ensure sufficient flexibility in its Accord so 
that by the time of its implementation in 2007, the most recent risk models available 
are used, not those prevailing in 2002. This will avoid  penalizing the private equity 
and venture capital industry on the grounds of  a lack of impact assessment.   24
Therefore, EVCA urges the Basel Committee to allow itself more time to develop a 
framework that will not only meet its requirements in terms of soundness of the 
Banking System, but will also enhance the development of the European private 
equity and venture capital industry, whose crucial role in economic dynamism is 
widely recognized. In addition, EVCA urges National  Supervisors not to increase the 
risk weight for private equity and venture capital as stated in the Standardized 
approach. Finally, EVCA urges the Basel Committee to amend the paragraphs related 
to Grandfathering 
6 in order to include positions taken until the date of 
implementation (e.g. by the end of 2002) and not the date of publication of the final 
Accord. The Committee is reviewing carefully all the responses and issues that the 
industry and generally all the involving parties raised. However, it is important to 
underline that the Committee reached a very important agreement in mid-October of 
2003, on a work plan for taking all the imposed issues and comments into account. 
Thus, a significant progress was made on major issues. What is most important to the 
Committee, is the quality and the consistency of the New Accord. At the same time, it 
is high need to provide banks with as much certainty as possible, while they plan and 
prepare for the adoption of the new rules.
7 Consequently, we can consider that the 
implementation of the New Accord will require a substantial resource commitment on 
the part of banks and supervisors alike. So, it is important to emphasize that the 
efforts that banks will need to undertake to comply with Basel II, build  on the efforts 
that some large and well-managed banks already had in train before the new 
framework was contemplated. According to William J. Mc Donough,  President and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
8, many banks are 
devoting more attention to enhance tracking and assessment of the quality of the 
loans they make. Further, banks have been looking to strengthen their credit 
assessments by employing experts who don’t stand to gain from overly favorable 
reviews. Time and effort has also been invested in working to pull all of this together 
                                                           
6 Third Consultative Paper, (CP 3), par.236, p.49 
7 Jame Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervison, Keynote speech at the Market Discipline Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
and BIS, Chicago, (November 2003). 
8 William J. Mc Donough, <<Implementing the New Basel Accord>> (Remarks, N . York, 
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in a management information and control system, that produces timely and accurate 
reports for senior management review. Thus, it is expected that much of the cost to 
banks of adopting the advanced approaches of Basel II will come from precisely these 
types of initiatives. Given that the largest banks, especially in the United States 
continue to grow, to prosper and to pursue new opportunities, they must 
simultaneously make the investments required to manage themselves appropriately. 
Likewise, the new framework is providing supervisors with an opportunity to enhance 
their ability to identify and respond to sources of banking risk  and to share this 
knowledge within the supervisory community. The Basel Committee was established 
precisely to maintain an open and constructive dialogue among banking supervisors. 
This spirit of communication will be more crucial than ever, as the framework is 
adopted across national jurisdictions. In order to ensure that market competition is 
driven by each bank’ s  strengths, rather than by differences in each country’s 
regulatory capital rules, the Committee established the Accord Implementation 
Group. This group, comprised of senior line supervisors, is responsible for promoting 
the consistency and quality of implementation of the New Accord. Moreover, the 
group has been established to facilitate the exchange of information among national 
supervisors  about  banks  and  supervisory  practices.   And this is something that we 
view as being critical  to successful implementation of the New Accord. Therefore, 
the sense of all the above is  that banks have both the desire and commitment to 
continue to develop their internal ratings systems in a manner consistent with the 
ideals embodied in the IRB framework. The discussions with the industry have also 
highlighted a number of areas, where banks may need to expand their efforts in 
preparing for implementation. These measures include the design and structure of 
rating systems, the availability and quality of credit data and the role of corporate 
governance in evaluating bank assessments. To conclude this part of  conclusions and 
proposals of my paper, I would like to underline, that the Banking System in order to 
be ready for facing the new standards of the New Basel  Capital Accord, should 
therefore, continue strengthening the collaborations between central banks, monetary  
authorities, bankers and private sector. In this regard, central banks have to provide 
the infrastructure where financial markets rely on, so that the best practices can be   26
adapted. In addition, it is also very important to harmonize and standardize the 
structure of the financial institutions, skills and regulations with the New Basel’s 
Capital Accord demands.  
 
2.  Pros and corns of the New Basel’s Capital Accord  Implementation for the 
development of SME’s 
The adjustments made by the Basel Committee have a specific impact on SMEs. 
In fact, they are characterised by 2 main elements:  
•  The menu of risk weight functions, that was extended by a special function for 
corporate exposures to SMEs borrowers where the aggregate amount of loans 
is higher than 1 euro million and the annual sales are less than 50 million 
euro
9. 
•  The eligibility criteria for classification in the private and retail sector have 
been made much less stringent. More specifically, all loans to enterprises 
under 1 euro million are now classified in this segment as long as they are 
given a standardised loan and lending treatment
10. Classification in the retail 
sector also has the advantage that the rating procedure is less complicated. 
Instead of an individual rating, multiple rating pools can be formed. Thus, we 
can say that only the collateral and the delinquency status of the individual 
borrower are verified. These loans are also exempted from the obligatory 
annual update required in the case of full-scale rating. 
  The instruments for risk mitigation also contain elements that specifically concerns 
SMEs. The typical collateral held by SMEs is now recognised as risk mitigating but 
only on condition that the ratio of the value of the collateral to the value of the loan 
does not fall below 30% (0% for receivables). The secured part of the loan is then 
calculated on the basis of minimal of over-collateralisation, which varies according to 
the type of collateral.   
Apart from the above mentioned: 
                                                           
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision : The New Basel Accord, (3
rd Consultative Paper, Basel 
2003, p.50) 
10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision : The New Basel Accord, (loc.cit.,p.47) 
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•  As the general increase in cost of borrowing conserns, it is considered that the 
adjustments introduced in July 2002, are extremely important as regards the 
estimation that the Basel II will lead to an increase in the cost of borrowing. For 
example, the size structure of SMEs in Germany suggests that most SMEs loans 
can be classified as private/retail exposures.
11 In that view, all are agreed that the 
capital requirement will increase for marginal segments. SMEs loans with an 
extremely weak credit rating and those that are either too large for classification 
in the private/retail segment or are  largely unsecured  will require more equity 
capital than to date. However, even for this category it is difficult to estimate to 
what extent this will result in an increase in borrowing cost. On the one hand,  the 
possibility to pass on increased capital costs suggests that the margins will not 
change from the situation under Basel I. However, it will be less the bank itself 
than the competitive situation that will decide to what extent this can occur. On 
the other hand, there is always the possibility that loans will open the door to 
other profitable transactions with the enterprise in question (e.g. administration of 
assets for the management , the management of interest and exchange risks). In 
such case, it can be more profitable for the bank to refrain from passing on 
increased  capital costs in full. These considerations are confirmed by an Ernst & 
Young study. The banks surveyed plan to continue avoiding passing on costs in 
full if they are adequately compensated by other transactions. The segment in 
which there will undoubtedly be a higher capital requirement and thus higher 
financing costs is that of equity investments. 
•  Referring to the reduced credit supply, we can say that a reduction in lending to 
SMEs can originate either on the demand or the supply side. A decline in demand 
would be likely, if loans to SMEs because more expensive overall. However,a 
reduction for demand in this reason is not inevitable for the quantity response 
depends on the price elasticity of demand in the various credit-rating segments. 
But it has been shown above that the Basel proposals on capital requirements are 
                                                           
11 Dorothea  Schafer <<The New Basel Capital Accord and its Impact on Small and Medium Sized 
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unlikely to lead to an increase in borrowing costs. A supply-side reduction would 
be possible, if the following 3 conditions were fulfilled: 
a)  Regulatory capital is scarce, in other words, the banks are operating close to 
the limit prescribed by the supervisory authority. 
b)  Basel II leads to an increase in the capital requirement for a bank’s entire 
SME loan portfolio and, 
c)  The bank has more profitable alternatives , (e.g. loans to large enterprises or 
investment banking activities. 
Overall, there is currently nothing to suggest that the capital requirement for SME 
loan portfolios is rising. But even this were the case, a reduction in credit supply 
could not be blamed directly on such a development. Capital costs are opportunity 
costs. Given that equity capital must be kept in hand for investment and trading 
activities, the opportunity costs for SMEs loan where capital is availiable are 
measured accordingly to the lost earnings from securities transactions or from loans 
to large enterprises. So, if the banks can earn higher profits from such alternative uses 
than from SMEs  loan, then a supply – side reduction in lending can be expected. 
However, it is difficult to achieve higher profits in securities trading ans in the highly 
competitive large loans segment . For all these it is obvious that if the margins are 
low enough (low opportunity costs), then additional capital will be freed up which 
could be used to back SMEs loans.  
 
To conclude, I think that it is very important to underline that the declared aim of 
Basel II is the differentiate between good and bad risks and to distribute risk costs 
according to the quality of the respective risks. If this approach really forces SMEs 
banks to keep more capital on hand than in the past , then the increase would indicate 
that there has been inadequate protection against unexpected default risks to date. 
But, according to Geman Bundesbank
12 the most important think is that the goals of a 
stable banking system and sufficient financing for SMEs may clash, at least in the 
short term.. Because of the extreme importance of a stable banking system  for the 
                                                           
12 German Bundesbank <<Credit Institutions  capital viewed from a  business and  a  regulatory 
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economy of the Member States of the E.U. a conflict of goals of this kind , certainly 
cannot be resolved by subordinating the goal of stability to that of financing. One way 
to avoid the conflict might be to consider expanding the programs that promote better 
creditworthiness. However, this solution would also lead to opportunity costs, whose 
economic effect would be to have assessed.   
 
Until recently, the discussion about the impact of Basel II on SMEs financing was 
held largely under the assumption of the worst-case scenario. Following the 
adjustments agreed in 2002, it is unlikely that such a scenario will ever become 
reality. In addition, one of the basic assumptons, in the discussion is that the SMEs 
sector is not capable of responding with adjustments of its own. Actually, Basel II 
could also act as a kind of mandatory cure that compels SMEs to adopt risk 
mitigating measures in their own interest and to thus improve their ratings.  
 
For all the aformentioned arguments, it is arising a widespread belief , that banks, 
especialy in Germany, (according to the relative reports of the German Bundesbank), 
are already extending loans in line with the new capital adequacy  framework. Thus, 
if somebody follows that argument, then the German Bundesbank’s view that the 
most recent  reduction in net lending is mainly cyclically determined and is a further 
indication that the New  Basel Capital Accord will not lead to any dramatic changes 
in SMEs access to loans.
13     
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